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INTRODUCTION 
Wage dispersion inside a firm, or variation in monetary rewards created by a firm’s pay structure, 
has long been considered a potent predictor of employee cross-firm mobility (e.g., Bloom and Michel 
2002; Carnahan et al, 2012; Gerhart and Rynes 2003; Pfeffer and Langton 1988). Despite the ample 
evidence, however, the relationship between dispersed wages and mobility continues to be poorly 
understood. The predominant view in this research focuses on the downsides of pay variance and the 
resulting mobility-inducing effects. For example, scholars have argued that intra-firm variance in pay 
inclines employees to switch employers (e.g., Bloom and Michel, 2002; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1990; 
Messersmith, 2011) because it triggers the perception of inequity and the feeling of relative deprivation 
(e.g., Glandon and Glandon, 2001; Messersmith et al., 2011; Wade et al., 2006). Yet, contrary to this 
perspective, a large body of work in strategy and economics associates wage dispersion with significant 
upsides (Bloom and Michel 2002; Castanias and Helfat 1991). For example, some studies posit that 
dispersed wages increase employee motivation and productivity because employees tend to exert greater 
effort in expectation of attractive future rewards (Gerhart and Rynes 2003). Although these perspectives 
imply that wage dispersion will reduce the rates of inter-firm mobility, few studies have attempted to 
reconcile this view with the findings prevalent in the mobility research. 
In this study, we address this shortcoming by turning our attention to the upsides of dispersed 
wages and identifying the conditions under which variance in pay might suppress inter-firm mobility. We 
argue that past research has masked this mobility-reducing effect of unequal pay because, in examining 
mobility outcomes, studies have paid little attention to the organizational level at which pay is dispersed. 
Most mobility scholars have considered the overall dispersion in wages, even though there exists 
significant heterogeneity in the dispersion level: pay variance may be vertical, when wages vary across 
organizational levels, or horizontal, when wages vary within an organizational level (see Conroy et al., 
2014 for a review). Given that they arise at different job levels, vertical and horizontal dispersion have 
therefore distinct bases: the former reflects the internal and external worth of jobs, and organizational 
policies on the relative value of jobs; the latter reflects differences across individuals holding same-level 
jobs (i.e., in qualifications, performance, or political connections) (Milkovich, Newman, and Gerhart, 
 1
2014; Baron and Pfeffer; 1994; Bloom, 1999; Shaw, Delery, and Gupta, 2002). We leverage this 
distinction between vertical and horizontal wage dispersion to identify the mobility-reducing effect of 
unequal pay and to separate it cleanly from the mobility-inducing effect, well-established in the literature.2 
We propose that pay dispersion suppresses inter-firm mobility when wage differentials are vertical. These 
differences in pay are likely to reduce inter-firm mobility because vertical dispersion is associated with 
beneficial employee outcomes, such as opportunities for internal advancement and aspirational 
comparisons. Conversely, pay dispersion will increase inter-firm mobility when such differentials are 
horizontal. Because these differences in pay are associated with harmful employee outcomes, such as 
negative social comparisons, fairness concerns, and limited advancement prospects, they will motivate 
workers to switch employers, generating the “mobility-inducing effect,” frequently seen in past research.  
We take advantage of the numerous empirical benefits of the large Swedish employee-employer 
matched panel data for the period 2001–2008 to test our arguments. Whereas many organizations observe 
policies of pay secrecy (Belogolovsky and Bamberger, 2014; Collela, et al., 2007), Sweden has had a long 
history of financial transparency since 1903, when tax returns became public. The Swedish sample merges 
data from the Firm Financial Statistics Database (Foretagens ekonomi [FEK]), containing the annual 
accounts of all limited liability firms in Sweden, acquired from the Swedish Companies Registrations 
Office, and the Longitudinal Integrated Database for Medical Insurance and Labor Studies (LISA), which 
draws on several different individual-level statistics obtained from registry databases for the entire 
Swedish population. Using these fine-grained population data on all firms, employees, and their 
occupational information, we identify all instances of mobility, including remaining in current 
employment, advancing internally, or moving externally to another employer. We further compute 
detailed and precise measures of horizontal and vertical dispersion in wages, based on hierarchical 
occupational classification (Tåg, Åstebro and Thompson, 2016).  
We find systematic evidence that the effect of wage dispersion on inter-firm mobility critically 
depends on the organizational level at which wages are dispersed: vertical variance in pay reduces 
                                                        
2 Although bases for vertical and horizontal pay dispersion are not comparable, past studies have treated the two as 
equivalent, and scholars linked the two with similar mechanisms and similar mobility outcomes (Carnahan et al, 
2012; Glandon and Glandon, 2001; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1990; Tsou and Lui, 2005). 
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external-mobility rates, whereas horizontal variance in pay induces external-mobility rates. Additional 
findings indicate that these opposite effects reflect different mechanisms attached to vertical and 
horizontal pay structures. First, consistent with the claim that vertical wage dispersion signals internal 
career advancement, bottom earners within the firm pay distribution who are, by default, furthest from the 
vertical wage ceiling and thus find the prospect of vertical advancement most appealing, will be the least 
likely to switch employers when wages are vertically dispersed. Top earners, by contrast, are the least 
sensitive to the mobility-reducing effect of vertical wage differentials because further advancement 
prospects are limited for these workers, motivating them to switch employers. Moreover, consistent with 
the claim that horizontal wage dispersion triggers negative consequences such as inequity, the mobility-
inducing effect of horizontal pay variance is strongest for bottom earners within an organizational level 
because these employees are most subject to the negative consequences of such pay structure. Conversely, 
the effect is weakest for top earners within each hierarchical level because these workers benefit from such 
pay variance the most.  
Overall, our results contribute to the understanding of how wage dispersion influences inter-firm 
mobility (Bloom and Michel, 2002; Carnahan et al, 2012; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1990; Messersmith, 
2011), by elucidating the critical role of organizational rank in driving the opposing forces associated with 
wage dispersion. Finally, our theory helps reconcile wage-dispersion downsides, associated with the 
feeling of relative deprivation and inequity, with wage-dispersion upsides, associated with stronger 
motivation to reap lucrative rewards. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Wage Dispersion and Inter-Firm Mobility: Past Research 
There is a general agreement that pay dispersion is a potent predictor of job switching (e.g., Bloom and 
Michel 2002; Gerhart and Rynes 2003; Pfeffer and Langton 1988) and  that a firm’s pay structure affects 
employee decision to leave current employment (Gupta et al., 2012; Gupta and Shaw 2014). However, 
despite the rich research inquiry into pay dispersion, in general, we still know relatively little about the 
effects of unequal pay on cross-firm mobility, in particular (see Shaw and Gupta, 2007, for review). A 
frequent finding in the literature is that wage dispersion induces higher rates of inter-firm mobility (e.g., 
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Nickerson and Zenger 2008; Hyll and Stark 2011; Sheppard, Lewicki, and Minton 1992) and that, 
consequently, variance in wages triggers considerable, negative consequences for employees (Pfeffer and 
Davis-Blake, 1990; Messersmith et al., 2011; Levine, 1993). For example, scholars have linked pay 
differentials with negative social comparisons, the feeling of relative deprivation (e.g., Nickerson and 
Zenger, 2008), inequity concerns (Lazear, 1989), and job dissatisfaction (Nickerson and Zenger 2008; 
Hyll and Stark 2011), more generally.  
Despite these important insights, however, past studies remain incomplete because little attention 
has been devoted to the benefits of unequal pay and the implications for mobility outcomes. This neglect is 
surprising given that other research has long emphasized the productivity upsides of unequal pay and the 
beneficial influence of wage dispersion on employee effort and motivation (Bloom and Michel 2002; 
Castanias and Helfat 1991; Pfeffer and Langton 1988). Although this line of work suggests that pay 
dispersion may benefit workers and thus reduce external mobility, this view has not been reconciled with 
the findings prevalent in the mobility research. Except for a small number of studies that have linked wage 
dispersion with lower mobility rates among top performers (Carnahan et al., 2014; Shaw and Gupta, 2007), 
little is known about when workers may find unequal pay attractive and when these wage structures will 
discourage individuals from job switching. In this study, we therefore turn our attention to the conditions 
under which dispersed wages might suppress the rates of inter-firm mobility.  
Wage Dispersion Within and Across Levels 
In examining the influence of wage dispersion on cross-firm mobility, scholars have frequently 
neglected the organizational rank at which wage dispersion arises. This neglect has obscured the 
possibility that variance in pay may trigger distinct mechanisms and lead to different mobility outcomes, 
depending on whether pay variance arises within (i.e., horizontal) or across (i.e., vertical) organizational 
levels.  
Although some scholars have distinguished between vertical and horizontal inequality in pay (see 
Conroy et al., 2014 for a review), an implicit assumption in past research has been that unequal wages 
trigger equivalent processes regardless of the level at which they occur. For example, the majority of 
studies have not conceptualized vertical and horizontal dispersion as distinct; rather, scholars have often 
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modeled an overall dispersion in pay (Carnahan et al, 2012; Glandon and Glandon, 2001; Pfeffer and 
Davis-Blake, 1990; Tsou and Lui, 2005). And, even in rare cases, when studies have separated these pay 
structures, scholars have neither compared them directly nor did they associate these two with distinct 
causal outcomes (Levine, 1993; Powell et al., 2010; Shaw and Gupta, 2007). Finally, important 
measurement challenges have plagued past studies, as scholars have frequently limited their analyses to 
top management teams when modeling vertical pay dispersion (Messersmith et al., 2011; Shen et al., 
2010; Wade et al., 2006), or relied on specialized contexts (i.e., sport teams and universities) when 
modeling horizontal pay dispersion (e.g., Becker and Huselid, 1992; Berri and Jewell, 2004; Mondello and 
Maxcy, 2009; Trevor et al., 2012; Cowherd and Levine 1992; Messersmith et al., 2011; Shen et al., 2010). 
Recognizing these conceptual and empirical limitations, recent studies have noted that “research on pay 
variation has obscured the differences between vertical and horizontal pay by generalizing and 
extrapolating freely from one type to another” (Conroy et al., 2014: 3), and that “researchers theorized at 
one level but operationalized variables at another, even though the specification of levels is critical and 
requires ‘care and precision’” (Klein 1999: 244). Finally, Shaw (2014) has emphasized the need to 
compare the consequences of vertical and horizontal wage dispersion, noting that the causal pathways for 
the two types of structures might be different (Shaw 2014: 534).  It is precisely this observation that 
motivates our assessment of the association between dispersed wages and external mobility, for vertical 
and horizontal inequality separately.   
The Mobility-Reducing Effect: Vertical Dispersion 
There is a strong rationale to expect that the propensity to make external moves decreases when 
wages are dispersed vertically and variance in pay is attributable to job levels (Devaro, 2006; Milkovich, 
Newman, Gerhart, 2014). We propose that vertical dispersion will reduce the rates of external mobility 
because it is associated with outcomes that employees consider beneficial, such as attractive advancement 
prospects or aspirational comparisons.  
First, because vertical differences are tied to upward moves within an organizational hierarchy, 
employees will perceive such dispersion in pay through an internal career-ladder lens (Doeringer and Piore, 
1971). This pay structure implies that, workers can, in principle, make sequential moves up the hierarchy 
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and incur pay raises each time they climb the promotional ladder because wages are attached to career 
ladders (White 1970; Spilerman 1977; Sørensen 1977). Importantly, in settings with developed internal-
labor markets, vertical advancement is more predictable and therefore more enticing. For example, 
average performance is often sufficient for continued retention (Lazear and Oyer, 2003; Kalleberg and 
Sørensen 1979), suggesting that the majority of workers will eventually climb the hierarchical ladder. 
Similarly, the threat of termination is low because employees need only to meet a minimum performance 
standard to keep their employment. Hence, workers will, on average, develop an expectation of climbing 
the hierarchical ladder and earning the rewards attached to higher-level jobs (Sørensen, 1977).  
Advancement through internal ranks may be further appealing because climbing organizational 
levels tends to be associated with sizable rewards. Scholars have established, for example, that pay 
increments tend to be greater when workers move across job levels than within a job level, since 
advancing in the hierarchy involves more significant increases in responsibility, qualifications, and 
prestige (e.g., Bidwell and Mollick, 2015). Empirical evidence corroborates this claim, with studies 
documenting that internal promotion ladders result in considerable monetary rewards (Doeringer and 
Piore, 1985; Lazear, 1989) and that upward movements within the hierarchy are associated with steep 
wage increases (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Sørensen, 1977; Bidwell and Mollick, 2015). There is a 
further rationale to expect that these steeper, more predictable increases in pay will enhance the 
attractiveness of advancement options available in current employment. The tournament theory, for 
example, has long indicated that competition for higher-level jobs is especially likely to induce effort and 
motivation when prize increases are greater at each level of competition (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; 
Lazear and Rosen, 1981), or when winning rewards is more predicable (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; 
Rosen, 1986).  
The prospects of internal advancement have important implications for the rates of external 
mobility. As opportunities to progress inside the firm become more appealing due to steeper pay 
increments and more predictable attainment, an employee propensity to switch employers will decrease. 
Opportunities to win rewards internally will motivate workers to preserve their attachment to current 
employer and to exert stronger efforts in expectation of future gains. It may even be that similar rewards 
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are difficult to achieve through external-mobility paths, or once an employee separates from the current 
job. For example, Bidwell and Mollick (2015) find that vertical attainment, as indicated by moves to jobs 
with greater responsibility and higher pay, is more likely to occur through internal than external mobility. 
Similarly, Groysberg (2010) finds that even star employees tend to underperform when they switch 
employers partly because equivalent advancement opportunities are difficult to replicate once an employee 
decides to leave. These studies collectively imply that potential payoffs associated with vertical wage 
dispersion are most attractive when workers continue advancing through internal ranks; conversely, these 
prospects of vertical attainment may become more tenuous once an employee makes an external move.  
Not only will vertical variance in pay signal attractive internal-advancement prospects but these 
upsides will likely outweigh any potential downsides (e.g., job dissatisfaction or inequity concerns) that 
vertically-dispersed wage may trigger. First, employees rarely rely on higher-level referents to evaluate 
fairness of their own pay because these referents might not be physically close or directly comparable to a 
focal employee. Rather, the primary goal of higher-level comparisons is to form expectations about career 
prospects and future performance (Gibson and Lawrence 2010; Heckert et al. 2002; Lockwood and Kunda 
1997); for example, workers rely on higher-level others when evaluating future pay (Heckert et al. 2002; 
Gibson and Lawrence 2010), and upper-level referents occupy the kinds of organizational positions to 
which an employee aspires (Buunk and Ybema 1997). Although many of these studies have recognized 
that higher-level referents may also induce the feeling of inadequacy and failure (Wheeler and Miyake 
1992; Wood 1989), such negative consequences only arise when comparisons are made with respect to 
highest- rather than next-higher-level referents (Wood 1989). This aspirational role of vertical referents is 
especially important when future career prospects are within an employee’s reach (e.g. Cowherd and 
Levine, 1992), because workers can form expectations for similar achievement and use information 
provided by higher-level peers on how to improve in order to receive a future promotion (Lockwood and 
Kunda 1997; Steil and Hay 1997). Only in extreme cases, when the distance from the social referent is 
high, does the perceived probability of attainment decrease and are individuals unlikely to identify with 
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upper-level referents (Nosanchuk and Erickson 1985).3 Overall, we therefore expect vertical wage 
dispersion to primarily signal internal career prospects and to consequently reduce workers’ inclination 
and willingness to switch jobs:   
H1: An increase in vertical wage dispersion will reduce the likelihood that an employee makes an 
external move. 
The Mobility-Inducing Effect: Horizontal Dispersion 
By contrast, horizontal wage dispersion, which arises across employees holding same-level jobs 
(e.g., Shaw, Delery, and Gupta, 2002; Yanadori and Cui, 2013), will lead to higher rates of external 
mobility, generating the frequent finding in past research. To the extent that dispersed wages give rise to 
costly comparisons or signal limited advancement prospects (Castanias and Helfat, 1991, 2001; Elfenbein 
et al., 2010; Zenger, 1992), which might incline an employee to seek more favorable employment 
destinations (Hyll and Stark 2011; Adams and Freedman 1976), we expect these processes to be primarily 
triggered when dispersion in pay is horizontal.  
First, the reference group theory posits that, when making comparisons in order to derive 
information and identity signals, individuals rely on socially and spatially proximate referents (Adams 
1963; Blanton and Christie 2003; Festinger, Schachter, and Back 1950; Kelley 1952; Merton 1957). Same-
level peers are particularly likely to serve as social referents because they are functionally equivalent (e.g., 
performing similar tasks and functions), physically proximate (e.g., co-located), and socially comparable 
(e.g., similar in age or tenure). There is further evidence that workers use these same-level peers when 
evaluating pay fairness or assessing their own performance (Feldman and Ruble 1981; Gibson and 
Lawrence 2010), and that they prioritize these comparisons over higher-level comparisons (Heckert et al. 
2002; Jackson et al. 1992; Lawrence 2006; Major and Konar 1984). This further implies that it is horizontal 
rather than vertical differences in pay that spur the perceptions of dispersion, envy, and feelings of relative 
deprivation, even when wage differences reflect differences in productivity.  
We further expect the downsides of horizontal dispersion to dominate any upsides that such 
variance in pay may generate. Although same-level wage differentials may motivate employees to exert 
                                                        
3 Consistent with this claim, a number of studies indicated that the feeling of relative deprivation might arise when 
comparisons are made vis-à-vis CEO positions (Wade et al., 2006). 
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effort in pursuit of attractive rewards, the majority of employees will find these attainment prospects less 
attractive because same-level differences do not indicate an internal career ladder. Rather, firms adopt 
such practices to select talent (Rosenbaum, 1979) and to sort higher performers from average and lower 
performers (Bloom and Michel, 2002; Blyler and Coff, 2003; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rasmusen and 
Zenger, 1990). Although top performers are attracted to such high-pay rewards (Caranahan et al., 2012), 
many workers will be unable to meet the requirements necessary to earn higher rents, while performing 
same-level jobs. This logic further implies that average and lower performers will face higher termination 
threats and form weak expectations of future rewards. Because horizontal differences in pay signal less 
certain and less predictable career opportunities, workers will be more likely to separate from current 
employer due to either voluntary or involuntary turnover. For example, horizontal variance in pay may 
prompt most employees to seek more attractive, better-matched opportunities, given that prospects within 
current employment appear limited. Overall, we expect external-mobility rates to increase when wages are 
dispersed horizontally because same-level dispersion generates significant downsides, triggering negative 
social comparisons or signaling limited advancement prospects.  
H2: An increase in horizontal wage dispersion will increase the likelihood that an employee makes an 
external move. 
Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity: Individual Pay Position 
Our core argument suggests that vertical and horizontal dispersions in wages affect cross-firm 
mobility in opposite ways because these pay structures trigger distinct processes. In what follows below, 
we probe these processes in greater depth. If our supposition is plausible, the predicted relationships 
should be amplified (dampened) for workers most (least) subject to the mechanisms we theorize.  
First, if vertical dispersion in pay reduces mobility rates by signaling attractive employment 
options, bottom earners within the firm will be the most subject to this effect. These workers are the most 
motivated by the prospects of vertical attainment because potential gains from pay differentials are 
highest for those who capture the least value. Studies in strategy and economics, for example, have long 
argued that effort and motivation are directly proportional to the magnitude of gains that a worker expects 
to derive: when promotion is associated with greater rewards, an employee will exert commensurate 
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effort to achieve the expected pay (e.g., Lazear, 1999; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Trevor and Watzeter, 
2006). Others have similarly suggested that firms with greater pay dispersion offer more room for 
advancement and are therefore most appealing to those at the bottom of the performance distribution 
(Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014). Because the prospects of climbing the promotion ladder will appeal to 
bottom earners the most (Bloom and Michel, 2002; Frank, 1985; Shaw and Gupta, 2007), these workers 
will be the least likely to separate from current employment in pursuit of alternative employment.  
Conversely, our argument implies that the mobility-reducing effect of vertical variance in pay 
will be weaker for top earners in the firm. A number of studies document that employees are more likely 
to leave in pursuit of alternative options, including switching jobs or entering self-employment, when 
room for future advancement is limited or when prospective opportunities are blocked (e.g., Kacperczyk 
and Marx, 2016; Sørensen 1977; Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014). Because top earners have already arrived 
at the most attractive opportunities in the firm, room for future advancement is, by default, limited. And 
though these top earners may derive the highest possible returns to their human capital (Canrahan et al., 
2012; Bloom and Michel, 2002; Blyler and Coff, 2003; Castanias and Helfat, 1991; Coff, 1999), 
opportunities for further attainment inside the firm tend to decline for these workers, weakening their 
attachment to their current employer. In the context of wage dispersion, this logic implies that the 
mobility-reducing impact of vertical dispersion will be weaker for these top earners, who are most likely 
to pursue alternative opportunities, either through other routes in paid employment or through self-
employment as a way to get ahead (Canrahan et al., 2012; Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014).  
H3a: The negative effect of vertical wage dispersion on the likelihood that an employee makes an external 
move will be amplified (mitigated) for bottom (top) wage earners between levels in the firm. 
Moreover, if horizontal wage dispersion increases mobility rates by triggering negative 
consequences, including relative deprivation and envy, bottom earners within a given hierarchy will be 
most subject to this effect. Studies on inequity and pay suggest that wage dispersion generates negative 
feelings proportionate with the inequity that workers perceive (Adams, 1963; Lazear, 1989; Stark and Hyll, 
2011): the more unfair an outcome appears to be, the stronger the perception of inequity, envy, and 
discontentment. When these negative feelings intensify, employees become more willing and more 
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motivated to leave current employment and to rectify the perceived inequity (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 
1992; Pfeffer and Langton, 1993; Trevor and Wazeter, 2006). Bottom earners within a given level will 
view horizontal variance in pay as unfair because the downsides of such wage structure are most acute for 
those who capture the least value due to the current pay structure. Similarly, these bottom earners might 
also associate horizontal dispersion with limited opportunities because their low pay position relative to 
workers within the same job level signals a potential mismatch with the firm (Jovanovic, 1979; 1982), or 
indicates the firm’s inability to properly gauge the true value or fit of those employees. Because these 
negative consequences of horizontal pay are most pertinent to those who earn the lowest wages at their job 
level, these employees will be the most likely to leave current employment in search of a more favorable 
work environment.  
Conversely, top earners within a given hierarchy will be the least sensitive to such negative 
consequences of horizontal dispersion in pay. Because these workers benefit most from horizontal 
variance in wages, as they extract the highest surplus within their job rank, they are less likely to 
experience the feeling of relative deprivation or inequity. Similarly, for those who earn the most within 
their job level, horizontal dispersion in pay will be unlikely to signal limited career options or indicate a 
potential mismatch with the employer. It might even be that these top earners will experience some 
benefits of horizontal pay dispersion, consistent with studies documenting that employees are unlikely to 
separate from current employment when they perceive returns to their human capital to be relatively high 
(Bloom and Michel, 2002; Blyler and Coff, 2003; Castanias and Helfat, 1991; Coff, 1999). Together, 
these studies imply that the negative outcomes associated with horizontal dispersion in pay will be the 
least pertinent to top same-level earners. These workers, therefore, will be the least likely to quit in 
pursuit of alternative opportunities in the labor market.  
H3b: The positive effect of horizontal wage dispersion on the likelihood that an employee makes an 
external move will be amplified (mitigated) for bottom (top) wage earners within the same hierarchical 
level. 
METHODS 
Empirical Setting and Data 
Properly estimating the effects of horizontal and vertical wage dispersion requires detailed data on wages 
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within and across all hierarchical levels, as well as the corresponding information on employee mobility. 
Lacking comprehensive information, prior studies have often modeled an overall wage dispersion, without 
taking variance in organizational rank into consideration (e.g., Tsou and Liu, 2005; Glandon and Glandon, 
2001). Our study overcomes these challenges by taking advantage of two matched, longitudinal data 
sources from Sweden: LISA and the FEK. LISA includes records on the entire population of Swedish 
individuals and is maintained by Statistics Sweden. The data are constructed by pooling multiple 
governmental registers and by linking individuals to families, businesses, and workplaces. Information 
available in LISA can be aggregated to obtain data at the population level. LISA currently contains 
vintages from 1990 to 2008 and includes all individuals aged 16 and older who were registered in Sweden 
by December 31 of each year. The longitudinal nature of these data allows for a single person to be linked 
together for all years the individual has been registered in Sweden. We supplement LISA with FEK, a 
database that contains firm-level financial information based on the survey of all businesses in Sweden for 
tax purposes. FEK is conducted annually, and complete information is available from 1997 onwards. 
Firms in FEK are identified with a unique identification number, allowing for linking it with other 
databases, such as LISA. This integration allows us to match employees with firms and to connect 
individual information with firm-level information.  
Sample Selection and Variables 
We use panels from 2001 to 2007 for which we have occupational codes for nearly all Swedish 
workers. Several measures were calculated based on the information on prior panels, such as the number 
of past jobs or tenure. We chose to end the panel in 2007 in order to observe the employee inter-firm 
mobility at the panel’s end. We restrict our sample to firms with at least seven employees and at least two 
hierarchical levels, to ensure a meaningful measure of wage dispersion.4 We focus on individuals age 20 to 
59 during the sample period to avoid non-random attrition due to retirement. Our final sample contains 
7,057,819 individual-year observations.  
Dependent Variable. Our key dependent variable is an external move—defined as an instance of 
an employee’s change of jobs across organizations. We censor employees who exit current employment 
                                                        
4 We conducted additional sensitivity analyses and found the results to be also robust to a lower number of workers.  
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but do not take another job, because such exits may reflect other life-cycle processes, including retirement 
or death. We construct a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when an employee switches to another 
employer in a subsequent year, and 0 otherwise. 
Independent Variables.  To construct hierarchical levels in the firm, we follow prior studies 
(Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg 2012, Tag 2013, Tag, Åstebro, and Thompson 2016) and classify 
detailed occupational codes into four hierarchical groups: (1) manager, (2) professional, (3) associated 
professional, and (4) workers and operators. This classification procedure is consistent with the 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO)-88 adopted by the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), which Statistics Sweden also rely on to classify occupations.5 For example, manager 
category includes designations such as CEO, Director, Regional Manager, Rector, Fund Manager; 
professional category includes designations such as Statistician, Civil Engineer, Doctor, Business Analyst, 
Economist; associated professional category includes designations such as Laboratory Technician, 
Pharmaceutical Assistant, Bookkeeper, Occupational Therapist; worker and operator category includes 
Clerk, Cashier, Office Secretary, Machine Operator, Sales Person. These levels are hierarchical: wages 
across different occupations are ranked and the typical worker in a higher rank earns more (Tag, 2013).  
Consistent with the literature on wage dispersion (e.g., Bloom 1999; Bloom and Michel 2002; 
Carnahan et al. 2012; Sørensen and Sharkey 2014), we use the Gini coefficient to measure intra-firm 
variance within and across job levels. We begin by computing horizontal wage dispersion. The following 
formula is used to calculate the Gini coefficient for each level of firm-hierarchy-year: 
 𝐺 =
2∑ 𝑖𝑤𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1
𝑚∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1
−
𝑚+1
𝑚
 (1) 
where wi is the raw wage of the ith ranked individual in a given hierarchy within a firm and is indexed in 
non-decreasing order, and m is the number of workers within a given organizational rank. The Gini 
                                                        
5 First, in the payroll tax filings to the tax agency, employers provide a brief description of the professional tasks a 
focal employee is performing. The professional task description of roughly 80-85% of employees is covered in this 
procedure. Whenever this information is missing, relevant information is collected from industry associations, 
mostly occupational classifications as defined by the specific associations. This information is then synced with the 
classification methodology adopted by ISCO-88 (International Standard Classification of Occupations, 1988) of ILO, 
to ensure comparability to international standards 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco08/index.htm). Details of occupational task descriptions are 
available at: https://www.h5.scb.se/yreg/ssyk2012.asp  
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coefficient ranges from 0 (absolute equality) to 1 (absolute dispersion).  
To ensure consistency between the measures of wage dispersion, we further implemented the Gini 
coefficient as our primary measure of vertical wage dispersion, or variance in wages across hierarchical 
levels. Following Siegel and Hambrick (2005) who measured vertical wage differentials within top 
management teams, we began by using individual data to compute mean wages at each hierarchical level 
in the firm.6 We further followed well established research (e.g., Cowell, 2011; Gastwirth, 1972; Ohtake 
2008) and used these grouped data (i.e., wage averages reported by group) as an input into computing the 
Gini coefficient across hierarchical groups within each firm. Our empirical approach implies that we 
consider a relatively small number of groups to reflect the hierarchical levels in the firm. However, 
scholars have emphasized that, when estimating the Gini coefficient without individual observations, it is 
of crucial importance to properly group the data, even at the expense of the number of groups considered 
(e.g., Aghevli and Mehran 1981; Davies, 1989). In our case, the optimal grouping strategy is achieved 
when using four hierarchical levels because these levels demarcate vertical wage differences in our data 
(Tag, 2013). Nevertheless, to reduce any potential measurement error that might arise due to grouped data, 
we conduct a number of robustness checks, implementing three alternative measures of vertical wage 
dispersion. As it will be later discussed, our results are robust to these alternative measures. 
Control Variables. We control for a vector of firm-level and individual-level characteristics that 
may affect inter-firm mobility. We control for workers’ wage and tenure in the firm because they affect 
turnover directly (e.g., Carnahan et al. 2012, Jovanovic 1979, Topel and Ward 1992). Tenure is the 
cumulative employment duration of employees at the firm each year. We control for employee age, gender, 
and educational attainment, shown to be negatively associated with turnover (Viscusi 1979, 1980, 
Loprest 1992). Finally, we account for firm-level attributes: firm size (employee headcount), firm age, 
number of establishments, operating profit, and operating profit growth. 
Pay Positions. Employees are top (bottom) wage earners, when they rank above (below) the 90th 
(10th) percentile of the distribution of the absolute wage within their firm in any given year (Carnahan et 
al. 2012). We compute separate measures to indicate top and bottom earners within vertical and horizontal 
                                                        
6 Our results are also robust when we use median, minimum, and maximum value of the Gini coefficient.  
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wage distributions.7 We interact those measures with the corresponding measures of vertical and 
horizontal wage dispersion.  
Identification Strategy 
The individual-firm-year is our unit of analysis. We  include a firm-fixed effect to absorb any time-
invariant characteristics not captured by standard control variables. Specifically, we estimate the 
following regression: 
yilstk = αi + αt + αl + αk + β1 × Horizontal Wage Dispersion + β2 × Vertical Wage Dispersion + γ’Xilst + 
εilst, (2) 
where i indexes firms; t indexes years; l indexes industry; s indexes individuals; k indexes municipalities; 
and αi, αt , αl and αk are firm, year, and industry and municipality fixed effects, respectively. The dependent 
variable of interest is y, a dummy variable that indicates an instance of an employee’s switching to another 
job; X is the vector of control variables measured in the year preceding separation; and ε is the error term. 
The regression is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). We cluster standard errors at the firm level 
for models estimated with firm fixed effects and at the individual level for models estimated with 
individual fixed effects. Finally, in models with individual and fixed effects, we cluster standard errors at 
these two levels.  
An important concern pertains to potential endogeneity: the relationship between wage variance 
and inter-firm mobility could be spurious if both are driven by a third, difficult-to-observe variable. For 
example, high-human-capital employees might systematically sort into organizations with higher 
horizontal wage dispersion (or lower vertical wage dispersion) as well as to switch employers. We 
mitigate this concern in three ways. First, we re-estimate the baseline specifications with an individual 
fixed-effect estimator and firm-fixed estimator, which account for time-invariant heterogeneity of firms 
and employees. Second, we simulate treatment conditions for horizontal and vertical wage dispersion by 
implementing coarsened exact matching (CEM; Iacus et al. 2009), a nonparametric technique that allows 
matching on blocks, and has been found to perform better than the propensity score matching (Iacus et al. 
2011). Finally, we examine an association between wage dispersion in the origin and the destination firm.  
                                                        
7 While these measures are computed using an absolute wage, our results are also robust to using wage residual. 
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RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics is shown in Table 1. The average rate of cross-firm mobility in Sweden during the 
period of our study is 14.7%. Although one concern might be that findings in the Swedish context might 
not be easily generalizable to other settings, the external mobility rate in our sample is comparable to rates 
in samples from other countries, including the U.S. (11%, as reported by Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom 
(1994) and 8%, as reported by Carnahan et al., 2012)), and the U.K. (10.5%, as reported by Treble et al., 
(2001)).8  
The correlation is reported in Table A1 in the on-line Appendix. Table A2 in the Appendix reports 
the wage distribution across the firm’s occupational categories, as applied to the Swedish data. The mean, 
median, and variance of wages at upper hierarchical levels (e.g., level 1) are higher than those at lower 
hierarchical levels, consistent with our classification of occupations into hierarchical levels that are rank-
based. In addition, this table reports descriptive statistics on differences in gender, age, firm tenure, and 
education across job levels. Tables 2A and 2B report the count and the rate of internal and external 
mobility within the period of one year. As can be seen in Table 2A, opportunities for upward movements 
are substantial in our data, with 18 percent of all moves being made to upper positions within the firm. In 
contrast, 77 percent of all external moves reported in Table 2B are observed between lateral positions. 
***** Insert Tables 1, 2A and 2B about here ***** 
The main results are presented in Table 3. All regressions are variants of the linear probability 
model in equation (1) with cross-firm mobility as the dependent variable. The specifications in all 
Columns include year, industry, hierarchy, and municipality fixed effects. As shown in Columns (1) and 
(2), the coefficients on horizontal and vertical wage dispersion are remarkably stable across specifications 
with firm or individual fixed effects. For vertical dispersion, the coefficient is negative and lies between 
0.0627 and 0.0476, indicating that the probability of cross-firm moves decreases by 6.3 percent to 4.8 
percent, as vertical wage dispersion in the firm decreases by one standard deviation. These findings are in 
                                                        
8 Another concern might be that opportunities for internal promotion are richer in Sweden than elsewhere, limiting 
the external validity of our findings. However, this concern is mitigated because the average internal promotion rate 
in our sample is relatively low: 2.5 percent.  
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line with H1, indicating that vertical wage dispersion is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of 
external moves. For horizontal variance, the coefficient is positive and lies between 0.106 and 0.233, 
indicating that the likelihood of a cross-firm move increases by 10 percent to 23 percent, as horizontal pay 
variance increases by one standard deviation. These findings are in line with H2, indicating that horizontal 
wage dispersion is associated with an increase in the likelihood of an external move. Column (2) is 
estimated with individual-fixed effects, mitigating the concern that our results reflect time-invariant 
characteristics of employees. In Columns (3)-(4), we exploit cross-sectional heterogeneity in the worker’s 
pay position within the firm for horizontal and vertical dispersion in pay, respectively. Column (3) shows 
that, in response to horizontal dispersion, top earners within the hierarchy are less likely to separate from 
the firm, whereas bottom earners are more likely to do so, consistent with the posited mechanism: bottom 
earners are most subject to the negative consequences of horizontal dispersion, whereas top earners benefit 
from such dispersion the most. Column (4) shows that the mobility-reducing effect of vertical pay 
dispersion is amplified for bottom earners in the firm, consistent with the notion that those who earn the 
least have the most to gain from vertical pay variance. Conversely, the vertical dispersion effect is 
mitigated for top earners in the firm because opportunities for further advancement are limited for these 
workers (e.g., Carnahan et al., 2012). In Column (5), we re-estimate the baseline specification with all 
interaction terms jointly included and find that our results continue to persist. In Column (6), we re-
estimate the baseline specifications in Column (5) but now include both individual and firm-fixed effect. 
Although the direction and the statistical significance of the coefficients are recovered, the coefficient size 
changes: for horizontal pay dispersion, the probability of cross-firm mobility increases by 2 percent and 
for vertical pay dispersion the probability of cross-firm mobility decreases by 2.6 percent. Finally, in 
additional analyses (see the on-line Appendix in Table A3), we assess whether the moderating effects of 
pay position continue to persist when vertically dispersed wages are interacted with same-level pay 
position and vice versa. As can be seen, these estimates are similar to our prior findings: the effect of 
vertical wage dispersion continues being amplified (mitigated) for bottom (top) earners, even when pay 
position is operationalized within a job level. Similarly, the effect of horizontal wage dispersion is 
mitigated (amplified) for top (bottom) earners, even when pay position is operationalized across job levels. 
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These estimates suggest that our findings are not sensitive to whether pay position is specified within or 
across job levels.  
**** Insert Table 3 about here ***** 
Assumptions 
Internal Advancement and Social Comparisons. Our argument makes two assumptions. The first 
assumption we make is that vertical wage dispersion signals attractive career prospects in the firm because 
workers can expect to climb job ladders and in doing so extract greater rewards. Horizontal wage 
dispersion, by contrast, is not tied to career ladders; instead, it aims to sort out high performers from 
average and lower performers, motivating many workers to switch employers. The second assumption we 
make is that employees engage in wage comparisons. When wage is dispersed horizontally, these 
comparisons tend to be negative, because employees rely on same-level workers to evaluate pay fairness. 
But, when wage is dispersed vertically, these comparisons serve an aspirational function because workers 
view upper-level referents as a source of information and aspiration about future advancement.  
In what follows below, we formally test these two assumptions in additional analyses. First, we 
examine the relationship between pay dispersion and internal mobility, defined as an employee’s 
promotion to the next level within an organizational hierarchy. If our first assumption is plausible, vertical 
dispersion in pay will be positively associated with the odds of an employee’s advancement to the next 
level. Internal advancement is a dummy variable that takes a value of “1” if an employee moves from a 
lower- to a higher-level position within a firm at time t + 1, and 0 otherwise.  
The results for linear probability models with internal mobility as an outcome are reported in 
Table 4. A one standard deviation increase in vertical wage dispersion is associated with a 0.4 percent 
increase in the probability of climbing an internal job ladder. Conversely, a one standard deviation 
increase in horizontal wage dispersion is associated with a 2 percent decrease in the probability of 
climbing an internal job ladder. These results not only continue to persist when individual-fixed effects 
and individual- and firm-fixed effects are included in the model, but also are strengthened, as presented in 
Column (2) and in Column (3). Overall, these analyses verify our assumption that employees in firms with 
higher vertical wage dispersion are more likely to advance in internal ranks. 
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We test our second assumption, about social comparisons, indirectly by assessing the 
heterogeneous effects based on social similarity. Social comparisons are enhanced when individuals 
exhibit interpersonal proximity (Festinger 1954) and studies have found that social influence flows 
through individuals who share core demographics, such as gender, ethnicity, or age (e.g., Festinger et al. 
1950, Lawrence 2006; Kacperczyk, 2013). If such comparisons underlie our findings, the mobility-
reducing (mobility-inducing) influence of vertical (horizontal) wage dispersion will be amplified when 
employees are socially proximate. Social proximity will amplify the horizontal-dispersion effect because 
job concerns will be enhanced with social proximity of same-level peers; the more proximate the same-
level referents, the stronger the perception of inequity, unfairness, and limited job opportunities. Similarly, 
social proximity will amplify the vertical-dispersion effect because the aspirational function of higher-
level referents will be stronger when referents are socially similar and therefore easier to identify with.  
In the main analyses, we consider interpersonal proximity with respect to an employee’s age and 
tenure. Age and tenure are the key cues about expected career progress and rewards (Lawrence 1984), and 
employees compare themselves with others similar with respect to these dimensions (e.g., Zenger and 
Lawrence 1989). Age (and tenure) proximity is an absolute distance between an employee’s age (tenure) 
and the median age (tenure) of relevant peers—that is, peers either within or across job levels. We take an 
inverse of these measures such that higher values indicate greater social similarity. In Table 5, Columns 
(1)-(5), we report the results for key demographic (i.e., age) and functional (i.e., tenure) dimensions. 
Column (1) presents the baseline estimates of the social proximity variables in the probability of cross-
firm moves: both coefficients are consistent with those presented in the baseline analyses in Table 3. We 
first estimate the joint effect of wage dispersion and age similarity in Columns (2)-(3). Figures A1-A2 in 
Online Appendix plot the interaction of vertical and horizontal dispersion with the mean of age similarity 
as well as 2 standard deviations above and below the mean of age similarity. As predicted, a decrease in 
the association between cross-firm mobility and vertical dispersion is greater when age similarity is higher 
across hierarchy levels, suggesting that social similarity across hierarchy levels serves an aspirational 
function, amplifying the negative effect of vertical pay dispersion on mobility. On the other hand, the 
positive effect of horizontal dispersion on mobility is amplified as age similarity increases within the 
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hierarchy level, providing further evidence for the social comparison effect of wage dispersion. In 
Columns (4) through (5), we replace age similarity with tenure similarity and obtain similar results. 
Figures A3-A4 in Online Appendix illustrate the interaction effect with similar patterns. Whereas these 
main dimensions of social similarity support our prediction, we consider gender and ethnicity as additional 
similarity dimensions. In Table A4 (online appendix), we conduct similar analyses for other similarity 
dimensions, including gender and ethnicity. Columns (1)-(2) report the joint effect of wage dispersion and 
gender similarity. In line with our expectation, gender similarity amplifies the negative effect of vertical 
wage dispersion, as indicated in Column (1) of Table A4 and illustrated in Figure A5 in Online Appendix. 
However, as suggested by the coefficients (Column 2) and the interaction graph (Figure A6, Online 
Appendix), gender similarity within the hierarchy level negatively moderates the positive effect of 
horizontal wage dispersion on cross-firm moves. One interpretation of these results is that horizontal, 
same-gender comparisons differ across gender and the observed negative effect reflects the coefficient of 
comparison among men, who are over-represented in our sample. Women’s career referents tend to be at 
lower or the same levels in their career accomplishments (Gibson and Lawrence 2010, Major and Konar 
1984). It may also be that vertical, same-gender comparisons are stronger for men than for women because 
men’s career referents tend to occupy higher levels than those of women and women are less likely than 
men to rely on same-gender referents in higher positions (e.g., Gibson and Lawrence 2010). This could be 
because gender distribution in upper hierarchical levels is skewed in organizations and fewer same-gender 
career referents are available to women than to men (see Kanter 1977, Lyness and Thompson 2000). 
Alternatively, men identify with upward social referents because of higher self-confidence (Gastorf et al. 
1980, Gibson and Lawrence 2010, Ibarra 1992).9 To investigate these mechanisms, we re-estimate the 
baseline analyses for males and females separately. These additional results reported in Table A5 in the 
Appendix lead to several conclusions. First, same-gender comparisons amplify the horizontal-wage 
dispersion effect for women but not for men: the interaction of horizontal wage dispersion with gender 
                                                        
9 It may also be that women compete with other women for similar job opportunities. To assess this possibility, we re-estimated 
Columns (5)-(6) of Table A4 with a control the potential female competition for similar jobs. We proxied for the level of 
competition with a share of women in top positions in the firm: higher value indicates lower level of competition among female 
workers because more advancement opportunities are available for women in a given firm. Our results (available upon request) 
were recovered when the models were re-estimated with this covariate.  
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similarity increases the probability of cross-firm mobility for female workers but reduces for male workers. 
Second, same-gender comparisons amplify the vertical-wage dispersion effect for men but not women. 
Same-gender comparisons for vertical dispersion decrease the probability of cross-firm moves for men, 
indicating that the mobility-suppressing effect of vertical dispersion is observed for men. Together, these 
results provide a more nuanced view of how same-gender comparisons might moderate the wage 
dispersion effect on inter-firm mobility. In Columns (3)-(4) of Table A4, we estimate the joint effect of 
wage dispersion and ethnic similarity. Consistent with the cohesive implications of ethnic homogeneity, 
we find the effect of wage dispersion to be amplified by ethnic homogeneity, for both horizontal (Column 
3) and vertical variance in pay (Column 4). These patterns are similarly reflected in the interaction graphs, 
as shown in Figures A7-A8. Evidence presented here suggests that the association between cross-firm 
mobility and wage dispersion is generally stronger across employees who are socially proximate and thus 
more likely to engage in social comparisons.  
***** Insert Table 4 and Table 5 about here ***** 
Alternative Explanations 
Unobserved Sorting. An important concern might be that employees inclined to job-hop may sort 
differentially across firms, if they exhibit preference for firms with high-horizontal or low-vertical 
dispersion. Sorting processes could spuriously generate an association between unequal wage across and 
within hierarchies and cross-firm mobility. A standard method to account for such sorting is to estimate 
our models with fixed-effects estimators for an individual, firm, and spell (all our findings are robust to 
these specifications). However, the fixed-effect estimator only mitigates this concern if sorting arises due 
to time-invariant factors. To rule out the concern that our results reflect time-varying heterogeneity, we 
conduct a number of analyses. 
CEM Matching. First, we re-estimate the baseline specifications in Table 3, while matching 
employees on the key observables. We construct Horizontal Treatment dummy equal to “1” when 
horizontal wage dispersion falls above the median among firms in a given year, and Vertical Treatment 
dummy equal to “1” when vertical wage dispersion falls above the median among firms in the given year. 
Using these measures, we matched individuals on age, gender, country of birth (regionally grouped), 
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education level (low, medium, high), firm tenure and college GPA scores in a coarsened exact matching 
(CEM) model framework to generate separate samples to test horizontal and vertical treatment effect 
(King, Lucas and Nielsen, 2016). We used quartiles to coarse the data for continuous variables (age, firm 
tenure and GPA) and exact matching for categorical variables (gender, country of birth and educational 
level).10 In additional tests (available upon request), we verified that covariates were balanced between 
treatment and control groups, confirming the conditional independence assumption of coarsened exact 
matching.  
Table 6 re-estimates the main models in Table 3 with horizontal and vertical treatment dummies in 
separate samples created with matching procedure and with the inclusion of firm-fixed and individual-
fixed effects. Columns (1)-(2) confirm that the association between horizontal wage dispersion and cross-
firm mobility continues being positive, when employees are matched on key observables across firms with 
higher and lower horizontal wage dispersion. Similarly, Columns (3)-(4) show that the association 
between vertical wage dispersion and cross-firm mobility continues being negative and highly significant, 
when employees are matched on key observables across firms with higher and lower vertical wage 
dispersion.  
***** Insert Table 6 about here ***** 
Destination Firm. Second, we assess wage dispersion patterns in the destination firm relative to 
current employment. If our findings reflect unobserved preferences that incline employees to sort into 
certain types of firms, we would expect wage dispersion in the origin and the destination firm to be 
similar, as employees with stable preferences sort into similar kinds of firms in different time periods. By 
contrast, if wage dispersion has a causal effect, then we would expect wage dispersion in the origin and the 
destination firm to differ, as employees seek to find an environment with a more favorable pay structure. 
Specifically, employees most subject to the downsides triggered by horizontal pay variance (i.e., bottom 
earners) will seek more-equitable firms relative to past employment. Conversely, employees who benefit 
from horizontal dispersion the most (i.e., top earners) will seek less-equitable firms. We measure wage 
dispersion at the destination firm at time t (before an employee’s move) because, in choosing future 
                                                        
10 Our results are robust to matching around alternative cutoff points.  
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employment, employees consider the characteristics thereof prior to the move.11 Horizontal wage 
dispersion at the destination firm is measured at the level the worker joins. 
Table 7 presents OLS regressions to estimate the association between horizontal and vertical wage 
dispersion at the origin and the destination firm, conditional on mobility. We include a firm fixed-effect 
estimator at the destination firm to mitigate the concern that unobserved heterogeneity at the destination 
firm might confound our estimates.12 Estimates in Column (1) show that bottom earners tend to move to 
more-equitable positions relative to positions at the origin firm: the coefficient on the interaction between 
Bottom Earner and Horizontal Wage Dispersion is negative and statistically significant. Top earners tend 
to move to less-equitable positions relative to their past employment, as indicated by the positive 
interaction term of Top Earner and Horizontal Wage Dispersion. In Column (2), we re-estimate the 
baseline specification from Column (1) but focus on vertical wage dispersion. We measure vertical wage 
dispersion at the destination firm at time t. To the extent that vertical wage dispersion offers attractive 
advancement opportunities, we would expect workers to move to firms with similar or higher vertical 
wage dispersion, relative to past employment. The results indicate that bottom earners within the vertical 
pay distribution tend to move to organizations with higher vertical wage dispersion relative to past 
employer, consistent with the claim that workers seek employers with more attractive career ladders, 
conditional on mobility. Moreover, there is no significant difference in the level of vertical dispersion 
between the origin and the destination firm for top earners in the vertical pay distribution. This might be 
because it is difficult for these top workers to find more attractive advancement opportunities or that they 
are less motivated to do so. Together, these additional findings are consistent with our argument: 
horizontal pay dispersion motivates workers to join employers with comparatively lower levels of such 
variance in pay, most likely because workers seek to mitigate the negative consequences they experienced 
during past employment spell.   
***** Insert Table 7 about here ***** 
                                                        
11 As a robustness check, we develop an ex-post measure of wage dispersion at time t +1 (i.e., after an employee’s 
move) and find similar results.  
12 As a robustness check, we re-estimate these models with parent-firm fixed effect or individual fixed effect. The 
results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar.  
 23
Employee Ability. Despite the analyses above, one might still be concerned that unobserved 
differences in employee ability drive our results: for example, bottom horizontal earners may switch 
employers because they are of low ability, whereas top horizontal earners may switch employers because 
they are of high ability. However, this explanation is unlikely given that our results are robust to a battery 
of tests: the effect is amplified when workers are socially proximate, or when models are estimated 
“within individual,” or when workers are matched on observables. Nevertheless, we conduct additional 
analyses to probe this possibility.  
College GPA. We first examine cross-sectional heterogeneity in individual ability. For a 
subsample of employees in our data,13 we use an individual’s college GPA score to proxy for individual 
ability. In doing so, we follow a well-established line of work that uses school performance and 
achievement to account for unobserved differences in ability (e.g., Wise, 1975; Black and Lynch, 1996). 
To the extent that our results reflect low ability, the relation between wage dispersion and cross-firm 
mobility should be amplified for individuals with low GPA. We compute a “high-ability” indicator equal 
to 1, if an individual’s college GPA fell within the top 10 percent, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we compute 
a “low-ability” indicator equal to 1, if an individual’s college GPA fell within the bottom 10 percent, and 
0 otherwise.  
In Table 8, the main results for vertical and horizontal wage dispersion remain similar, even when 
we include a control for college GPA (Column 1). In Column (2), we find that the propensity to leave in 
response to horizontal wage dispersion is not driven by low college GPA; rather, the effect is amplified 
for high-GPA workers. In Column (3), we interact vertical wage dispersion with the GPA measures and 
find that college GPA does not change the propensity to leave when vertical wage dispersion is high. 
Finally, in Column (4), we re-estimate the interaction terms jointly in one model: the results are consistent 
with those in Columns (2)-(3). Collectively, these additional tests suggest that our findings are unlikely to 
be driven by low-ability workers.  
Wage Transparency. Our argument implies that workers make mobility decisions in response to 
                                                        
13 In additional analyses, we assessed whether workers with non-missing GPA data were systematically different 
from workers with non-missing data. However, we found no statistical differences across the main observables.  
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information about others’ wages, as opposed to inherent observable or unobservable characteristics. We 
verify this claim by assessing the sensitivity of our findings to changes in wage transparency: our 
expectation is that the wage-dispersion effect should be amplified when wage transparency increases and 
more information about pay is available. We examine this possibility by assessing whether an exogenous 
change in wage transparency moderates our main effects. Although wage information has long been 
possible to access in Sweden, wages became even more transparent when a private firm named Ratsit 
launched a website in 2006 (followed by other firms), enabling anyone to access the tax records on the 
click of mouse and free of charge, in the comfort and anonymity of home.14 If workers react to information 
about others’ pay, we would expect the mobility effect of horizontal and vertical wage dispersion to be 
amplified, following an increase in wage transparency.  
To conduct this test, we compute an indicator variable Ratsit Launch equal to 1, if the year is 2006 
or greater, and 0 otherwise. The results presented in Table 9 lend support to our prediction. Column (1) 
presents the baseline effect of Ratsit launch on cross-firm mobility. Column (2) shows that, when 
interacted with Ratsit Launch, horizontal wage dispersion has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient. This indicates that the mobility-inducing effect of horizontal wage dispersion increased 
following an increase in wage transparency. However, an interaction term between Ratsit Launch and 
Vertical Wage Dispersion is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Columns (3)-(4) re-estimate 
the same specifications but include an individual-fixed effect, as well. The interaction between Ratsit 
Launch and Horizontal (Vertical) Wage Dispersion continues being amplified (mitigated) and the 
coefficients are statistically significant in both cases. These results provide additional evidence that our 
effects reflect workers’ response to information about pay.  
***** Insert Tables 8 and 9 about here ***** 
Unemployment Transition. In another test, we rely on transition into unemployment, given that 
workers with low ability are at a higher risk of unemployment spell. In Table A6 and Table A7 (see on-
                                                        
14 Ratsit.com handled an average of 50,000 online credit checks a day (Nordstrom, 2007). As described by the 
Swedish Data Inspection Board lawyer, “Your neighbor knows what you’re making, your brother-in-law knows 
what you’re making, and people around you can know whether you’re on any records for outstanding payments. It’s 
private and a bit embarrassing.” (Nordstrom, 2007). 
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line Appendix), we re-estimate models in Tables (3) and Table (5) but censor workers with unemployment 
gaps, most likely to have entered unemployment. Although the sample size decreases by 6 percent, we 
obtain similar estimates across both of these tables. As an additional test, we estimate a multinomial logit 
model with unemployment and cross-firm mobility as competing risks. In Table A8 (on-line Appendix), 
Column (1), our results continue to persist (except for the interaction between vertical wage dispersion and 
bottom earners where the coefficient is not significant). Finally, in Column (2), neither vertical nor 
horizontal wage dispersion is significantly associated with unemployment, mitigating a concern that low-
ability workers might drive our findings.  
Other Robustness Checks 
In Table A9 (on-line Appendix), we report additional robustness checks. First, an important 
concern is that our analyses may include multi-establishment firms in which social comparisons are 
weaker due to geographic distance. Although this would bias our results against significant findings, we 
re-estimate our baseline specification excluding multi-establishment firms. Doing so reduces the sample 
size by 53 percent. However, as shown in Column (1), our results are robust to this exclusion. Second, in 
Column (2), we re-estimate our baseline specification using a logistic model to address the concern that 
our main analyses use a linear probability model. Although the usual out-of-sample prediction concerns 
with linear probability models are not present in our estimations because of the large sample size, we 
additionally show that our results are robust to logitistic model specification. Further, in Columns (3)-(4), 
we re-estimate baseline specifications with alternative measures of horizontal and vertical wage dispersion. 
First, following prior studies (e.g., Siegel and Hambrick 2005), we compute an alternative measure of 
vertical wage dispersion as the difference between the average level of pay in the focal individual’s 
hierarchy and the average level of pay in the hierarchy immediately above. By default, this measure takes 
a value of zero for those occupying the highest hierarchical positions because these individuals face no 
further growth prospects. The greater the value of our measure, the higher the differential in average 
compensation between the pay of those at the next level in the hierarchy. As can be seen, the results 
remain robust, with a negative coefficient indicating that the likelihood of inter-firm mobility decreases, as 
vertical wage dispersion increases. As another robustness check, we operationalize horizontal and vertical 
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wage dispersion as the distance between a focal employee’s pay and the average pay in the relevant 
referent group. Horizontal wage distance is the difference between a focal employee’s pay and the average 
pay of same-level peers. Vertical wage distance is the difference between a focal employee’s pay and the 
average pay at the next hierarchical level. Similar to our previous measure, this measure equals zero for 
individuals occupying the top hierarchy levels. As shown in Column (4), the results are robust, with a 
positive coefficient on horizontal wage distance and a negative coefficient on vertical wage distance. As 
another robustness check, we use the Theil index (Theil 1967) in lieu of the Gini coefficient. The Theil 
index is derived as a particular case of a more general entropy and is often used to measure dispersion 
(Theil 1967). Because it is possible to decompose the Theil index to estimate the components of wage 
dispersion across and within groups, we use this measure for robustness. As shown in Column (5), the 
main effect of horizontal and vertical wage dispersion is similar to before. In unreported analyses, we 
include an individual fixed effect to rule out the concern that unobserved time-invariant characteristics of 
employees might drive our findings (available upon request). The coefficients on the Theil index are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to before, suggesting that the results are robust across different 
measures of wage dispersion. As another robustness check, we constructed measures of horizontal and 
vertical wage dispersion but collapsed “associate professionals” and “professionals” categories. The 
results reported in Column (6) are similar to our previous findings, suggesting that the estimates are not 
sensitive to the distinction between these two categories.15 Finally, we re-estimated the baseline analyses 
splitting the sample by the organizational level, to assess whether the effects of vertical wage dispersion 
differed at each level of the organizational hierarchy. These estimates were largely consistent with our 
earlier analyses on wages: the association between vertical pay dispersion and mobility was strongest for 
employees at the bottom level of the organizational hierarchy. By contrast, the effect was weakest for 
workers at the top level of the organizational hierarchy. These results (unreported and available upon 
request) are consistent with the cross-heterogeneity in wages that we explored in Table 3.   
DISCUSSION 
The analyses we present here make a number of contributions. First, we contribute to the growing 
                                                        
15 The results are robust to including individual-fixed effects and firm-firm fixed effects.  
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literature on employee movements across organizations (Bidwell 2011; Bidwell and Mollick 2015; 
Cappelli 1999) by shedding light on the antecedents of cross-firm mobility. To date, research on wage 
dispersion and mobility has predominantly focused on the downsides of unequal pay and scholars have 
documented the mobility-inducing effect of wage dispersion. However, this view has not been reconciled 
with the alternative perspective, which emphasizes the incentive and productivity benefits of dispersed pay 
(Bloom and Michel 2002; Castanias and Helfat 1991).  
In this study, we address this shortcoming by turning our attention to these positive consequences 
of dispersed and identifying the conditions under which wage dispersion suppresses cross-firm mobility. 
We propose that the wage-dispersion effect is contingent on the organizational rank: whether wages vary 
within or across levels in the firm. Specifically, building on the literature on employment relationship and 
internal labor markets, we argue that vertical wage dispersion suppresses cross-firm mobility because 
employees view such variance as beneficial. Further, these benefits dominate any negative consequences 
of vertical dispersion, such as negative social comparisons or limited career opportunities. By contrast, 
horizontal wage dispersion increases cross-firm mobility because it is primarily associated with negative 
consequences, which increase an individual’s propensity to switch employers, either because of voluntary 
or involuntary separation. Consistent with this claim, we find that horizontal wage dispersion leads to an 
increase in inter-firm mobility, while vertical wage dispersion leads to a decrease in inter-firm mobility. 
More generally, by shedding light on organizational rank, our study reconciles two different theoretical 
perspectives on the effects of wage dispersion: one rooted in the psychological literature and focused on 
the downsides of social comparisons associated with dispersed pay, and one rooted in economics and 
strategy, and focused on the upsides of incentives and productivity of wage dispersion.  
Our analyses probed deeper into other mechanisms we theorized. First, we found that a worker’s 
position in the pay distribution moderates the main effects, consistent with our argument that vertical and 
horizontal pay dispersion trigger different causal processes, leading to different outcomes. The association 
between horizontal wage dispersion and cross-firm mobility is amplified for bottom earners within each 
hierarchy because these workers are most subject to the downsides of pay dispersion. Conversely, the 
effect of horizontal wage dispersion is mitigated for top earners because these workers benefit from 
 28
unequal pay the most. Finally, the vertical-wage dispersion effect is amplified for bottom earners across 
hierarchies because these workers find internal career ladder most enticing. In contrast, the effect is 
mitigated for top earners because further career prospects appear to be limited for those who are already at 
the top. 
Moreover, in additional analyses, we verified our theoretical assumptions. First, consistent with 
the theories of internal labor markets and employment relationship (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; 1985; 
Lazear and Oyer, 2003; Kalleberg and Sørensen 1979), we found that vertical (horizontal) wage dispersion 
is associated with a higher (lower) likelihood of climbing the next level in the firm. These findings 
confirm that vertical wage dispersion is more likely than horizontal wage dispersion to signal attractive 
advancement options. Moreover, consistent with the theories of social comparisons underlying the 
mobility effects of dispersed wages, our findings are amplified when peers are proximate with respect to 
age, gender, ethnicity, and experience. Our findings also revealed complex dynamics for same-gender 
comparisons: horizontal wage comparisons increase inter-firm mobility when made by women, but not by 
men. Conversely, vertical wage comparisons reduce inter-firm mobility when made by men, but not by 
women. Similarly, past research has documented that same-gender comparisons differ within and across 
hierarchical levels (Gibson and Lawrence 2010). 
Yet more research on vertical and horizontal wage dispersion is needed. We have theorized the 
conditions under which wage dispersion suppresses cross-firm mobility. But researchers can also 
profitably address the potential trade-off between relative and absolute pay and their relation with mobility 
decisions. For example, an intriguing path of inquiry is to examine whether employees are willing to 
exchange a higher absolute salary (and lower relative salary) in one organization with a lower absolute 
salary (and higher relative salary) in another organization. This possibility is consistent with Frank’s 
argument about being a big fish in a small pond (Frank, 1985), which suggests that decision makers are 
more concerned with their internal status than their global status. Whether this logic applies to wage 
dispersion and mobility is an area scholars might want to investigate in the future. Another implication or 
our findings is that combining high vertical and low horizontal pay dispersion might be optimal for firms 
and workers. As an initial step, we assessed firms with these characteristics in our sample. Preliminary 
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analyses reveal that firms which combine high levels of vertical wage dispersion and low levels of 
horizontal wage dispersion might be characterized by longer employee tenure, a larger proportion of 
educated employees, higher absolute wages, and higher operating profits, relative to other firms in our 
sample. Given these intriguing descriptives, future research should examine whether and how firms 
benefit from the combination of vertical and horizontal pay and under what conditions they tend to do so. 
A fruitful research avenue would be to investigate the impact of wage dispersion on transition to 
entrepreneurship. Specifically, more attention is required to understand how perceptions of fairness and 
expectations of future pay influence the decision to become an entrepreneur. Relatedly, Shah, Agarwal and 
Echambadi (2016) find that the perceived dispersion not only for one’s own compensation, but also in how 
the organization treated others was a critical push factor for the “ringleader” founders. Finally, although 
our findings suggest that vertical wage dispersion is associated with significant benefits for workers, 
encouraging them to remain in current employment, further research should investigate whether vertical 
wage dispersion also triggers job concerns, such as the perception of inequity or lower product quality 
(Cowherd and Levine, 1993). Whether and when the benefits of vertical wage dispersions might be 
outweighed by the possible downsides should be subject of further scholarly inquiry.  
Methodologically, our setting offered key advantages with respect to wage transparency and social 
comparisons. Because wages are transparent in Sweden, this setting offers a significant advantage of 
quantifying the effects of horizontal and vertical wage dispersion more precisely. But our findings are 
likely to generalize to other contexts, where pay differentials are less transparent. In particular, wage 
comparison may still take place via informal channels that transmit information about peer wages. 
However, our results are less applicable to firms with flat structures, in which hierarchical distinctions are 
absent. For example, in entrepreneurial firms in which wages are unlikely to be dispersed across levels, the 
decision to switch jobs may be determined by wages dispersed horizontally (Zenger 1992). Additional 
research on the relationship between wage dispersion and mobility in such organizations is warranted. 
Relatedly, future studies may want to investigate the effects we document here in other settings. Although 
the rates of external mobility in Sweden are fairly comparable to those in other countries, it is nevertheless 
important to assess whether our findings generalize to other labor markets, with different institutional 
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settings and different organizational structures. It might be fruitful, for example, to examine whether 
vertical wage dispersion continues to exert an equally significant role in countries with less hierarchical 
organizations and less well-developed internal labor markets.  
Overall, this study revisits the well-established association between wage dispersion and cross-
firm mobility, and we demonstrate different antecedents of external moves. Although the majority of 
studies have documented the mobility-inducing effect of wage dispersion, our study illuminates the 
conditions under which wage dispersion suppresses cross-firm mobility. We find that the likelihood of 
job-hopping is negatively associated with vertically dispersed wages, because such wage differences are 
tied to different job levels, influencing one’s expectations about future attainment. At the same time, our 
results provide strong evidence that the likelihood of job-hopping is positively associated with horizontally 
dispersed wages, because such dispersion triggers significant downsides for employees —which tend to 
push workers out of an organization. Together, these insights indicate that although wage dispersion 
within the firm is important for understanding individual mobility, so too is the firm’s internal structure. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
External move 0.147 0.354 0.000 1.000 
Top earner (90th quartile of firm-hierarchy-year) 0.115 0.319 0.000 1.000 
Bottom earner (10th quartile of firm-hierarchy-year) 0.097 0.297 0.000 1.000 
Top earner (90th quartile of firm-year) 0.096 0.294 0.000 1.000 
Bottom earner (10th quartile of firm-year) 0.094 0.292 0.000 1.000 
Female 1.353 0.478 1.000 2.000 
Swedish  0.858 0.349 0.000 1.000 
Age 39.513 10.704 20.000 59.000 
Age squared 1675.892 862.571 400.000 3481.000 
Wage (in thousands) 287.882 199.265 1.001 27642.646 
Wage squared (in millions) 122582.63 1361999.716 1.002 7.641e+08 
Tenure 7.030 5.769 1.000 22.000 
Tenure squared 82.701 114.634 1.000 484.000 
Education < 12 years 0.459 0.498 0.000 1.000 
Education = 12 years 0.256 0.437 0.000 1.000 
Education >12, <=15 years 0.278 0.448 0.000 1.000 
Education >=16 years 0.006 0.080 0.000 1.000 
Hierarchy level 1 0.047 0.211 0.000 1.000 
Hierarchy level 2 0.131 0.337 0.000 1.000 
Hierarchy level 3 0.198 0.398 0.000 1.000 
Hierarchy level 4 0.624 0.484 0.000 1.000 
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No. of hierarchies 3.653 0.654 2.000 4.000 
Operating profit 285776.573 2140791.325 -2.072e+07 24220000.000 
Annual operating profit growth 18.173 13418.209 -5923446.000 24220000.000 
Firm age 12.634 6.380 1.000 22.000 
Nr. of establishments 47.629 150.918 1.000 1257.000 
Nr. of employees 2283.041 4810.706 7.000 31764.000 
Horizontal wage dispersion 0.185 0.062 0.000 0.958 
Vertical wage dispersion 0.096 0.053 0.000 0.704 
Observations 7,057,819    
Table 2A: Internal movements between hierarchical positions 
 Subsequent Position in the Same Firm  
 Origin Position Manager Professional Assoc. Professional Technical Worker Total 
Manager N/A 8,585 11,004 5,893 25,482 
% N/A 33.7 43.2 23.1 100% 
Professional 14,137 N/A 30,454 4,835 49,426 
% 28.6 N/A 61.6 9.8 100% 
Associate Professional  16,080 40,443 N/A 43,513 100,036 
% 16.1 40.4 N/A 43.5 100% 
Technical Worker 13,890 10,247 55,475 N/A 79,612 
% 17.4 12.9 69.7 N/A 100% 
Total 44,107 59,275 96,933 54,241 254,556 
 
Table 2B: External movements between firms and hierarchical positions 
 Subsequent Position in the New Firm  
 Origin Position Manager Professional Assoc. Professional Technical Worker Total 
Manager 16,934 2,929 3,285 2,465 25,613 
% 66.1 11.4 12.8 9.6 100% 
Professional 14,137 4,276 69,817 11,404 2,831 
% 4.8 79.0 12.9 3.2 100% 
Associate Professional  4,117 12,942 74,784 14,827 106,670 
% 3.9 12.1 70.1 13.9 100% 
Technical Worker 3,521 6,031 21,032 309,674 340,258 
% 1.0 1.8 6.2 91.0  100% 
Total 44,107 91,719 110,505 329,797 560,869 
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Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
  
 
 
 
 
Table 3. OLS Regressions of Cross-Firm Mobility 
     
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Horizontal Wage Dispersion 0.106*** 0.233*** 0.113*** — 0.106*** 0.0208*** 
 (0.00358) (0.00372) (0.00369) — (0.00370) (0.00416) 
Vertical Wage Dispersion -0.0627*** -0.0476*** — -0.0414*** -0.0551*** -0.0258*** 
 (0.00706) (0.00463) — (0.00712) (0.00713) (0.00593) 
Horiz. wage dispersion  Top earner (horiz.) — — -0.0551*** — -0.0636*** -0.0324*** 
 — — (0.00564) — (0.00564) (0.00733) 
Horiz. wage dispersion  Bottom earner (horiz.) — — 0.107*** — 0.120*** 0.0576*** 
 — — (0.00655) — (0.00666) (0.00810) 
Vert. wage dispersion  Top earner (vert.) — — — 0.0236** 0.0333*** 0.0302** 
 — — — (0.00729) (0.00745) (0.0114) 
Vert. wage dispersion  Bottom earner (vert.) — — — -0.0483*** -0.0579*** -0.0371*** 
 — — — (0.00764) (0.00781) (0.00984) 
Top earner (horizontal) 0.000432 0.00567*** 0.0180*** — 0.0152*** -0.00321* 
 (0.000610) (0.000757) (0.00104) — (0.00106) (0.00135) 
Bottom earner (horizontal) 0.0177*** 0.0135*** 0.0187*** — -0.00731*** -0.00346* 
 (0.000717) (0.000860) (0.00120) — (0.00134) (0.00158) 
Top earner (vertical) -0.00236*** 0.000311 — 0.0126*** 0.00995*** -0.00124 
 (0.000637) (0.000794) — (0.000738) (0.000810) (0.00117) 
Bottom earner (vertical) 0.0243*** 0.0119*** — 0.0453*** 0.0356*** 0.0140*** 
 (0.000750) (0.000909) — (0.000832) (0.00104) (0.00126) 
Age -0.00553*** — -0.00501*** -0.00491*** -0.00493*** — 
 (0.0000922) — (0.0000906) (0.0000906) (0.0000907) — 
Age Squared 0.0000410*** 0.0000324*** 0.0000357*** 0.0000343*** 0.0000346*** -0.000384*** 
 (0.00000110) (0.00000328) (0.00000109) (0.00000109) (0.00000109) (0.00000462) 
Tenure -0.0149*** 0.0409*** -0.0147*** -0.0146*** -0.0146*** 0.0956*** 
 (0.0000794) (0.000113) (0.0000793) (0.0000793) (0.0000793) (0.000332) 
Tenure Squared 0.000518*** -0.000794*** 0.000513*** 0.000512*** 0.000511*** -0.00191*** 
 (0.00000385) (0.00000602) (0.00000384) (0.00000384) (0.00000384) (0.00000817) 
Education =12 -0.00286*** 0.0117*** -0.00167*** -0.00196*** -0.00198*** 0.0148*** 
 (0.000306) (0.00309) (0.000305) (0.000305) (0.000305) (0.00359) 
Education >12,<=15 0.00928*** 0.00928*** 0.0104*** 0.0102*** 0.00970*** 0.0505*** 
 (0.000347) (0.000347) (0.000345) (0.000345) (0.000346) (0.00384) 
Education >15 0.00339* 0.00339* 0.00563*** 0.00445** 0.00328* 0.0252* 
 (0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00148) (0.00148) (0.00148) — 
Female -0.0141*** -0.0141*** -0.0174*** -0.0175*** -0.0178*** — 
 (0.000291) (0.000291) (0.000277) (0.000276) (0.000277) — 
Swedish  0.00940*** 0.00940*** 0.0105*** 0.0103*** 0.0103*** — 
 (0.000334) (0.000334) (0.000332) (0.000332) (0.000332) — 
Wage -0.0000115*** -0.0000115*** -0.0000275*** -0.0000358*** -0.0000333*** -0.0000148*** 
 (0.00000126) (0.00000126) (0.00000124) (0.00000124) (0.00000135) (0.00000230) 
Wage squared 1.22e-09*** 1.22e-09*** 2.38e-09*** 2.87e-09*** 2.66e-09*** 5.52e-10*** 
 (1.45e-10) (1.45e-10) (1.43e-10) (1.43e-10) (1.46e-10) (1.05e-10) 
Operating Profit -7.63e-10*** -7.63e-10*** -7.89e-10*** -7.26e-10*** -7.39e-10*** -1.53e-09*** 
 (9.06e-11) (9.06e-11) (9.05e-11) (9.06e-11) (9.06e-11) (6.77e-11) 
Annual Operating Profit Growth -7.41e-10 -7.41e-10 -9.12e-10 -1.03e-09 -1.04e-09 7.90e-09 
 (7.85e-09) (7.85e-09) (7.85e-09) (7.85e-09) (7.84e-09) (8.73e-09) 
Nr. of Establishments 0.000503*** 0.000503*** 0.000499*** 0.000505*** 0.000501*** 0.000153*** 
 (0.0000168) (0.0000168) (0.0000168) (0.0000168) (0.0000168) (0.0000151) 
Nr. of Employees -0.000000284 -0.000000284 1.32e-08 -0.000000259 -0.000000252 -0.0000138*** 
 (0.000000379) (0.000000379) (0.000000378) (0.000000379) (0.000000379) (0.000000348) 
Clustered Standard Errors  Firm Individual Firm Firm Firm Firm and Ind. 
Firm fixed effect Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hierarchy Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effect No          Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 7,057,819 7,057,819 7,057,819 7,057,819 7,057,819 7,057,819 
R2 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.314 0.737 
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Table 4. OLS Regressions of Internal Mobility 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
Horizontal wage dispersion -0.0150*** -0.0728*** -0.0942*** 
 (0.00131) (0.00213) (0.00328) 
Vertical wage dispersion 0.0104*** 0.0285*** 0.0326*** 
 (0.00115) (0.00124) (0.00173) 
Age 0.00183*** - - 
 (0.0000318)   
Age Squared -0.0000238*** -0.0000589*** -0.0000253*** 
 (0.000000381) (0.00000152) (0.00000210) 
Tenure -0.000724*** -0.00326*** -0.00428*** 
 (0.0000359) (0.0000576) (0.000103) 
Tenure Squared 0.0000400*** 0.000143*** 0.000165*** 
 (0.00000221) (0.00000418) (0.00000500) 
Education=12 0.00330*** 0.00226 - 
 (0.000122) (0.00125)  
Education>12;<=15 0.0120*** 0.0218*** - 
 (0.000159) (0.00137)  
Education>15 0.0120*** 0.00938*** - 
 (0.000563) (0.00267)  
Female 0.00239*** - - 
 (0.000125)   
Swedish  0.00538*** - - 
 (0.000130)   
Wage 0.00206*** -0.00313*** -0.00564*** 
 (0.0000800) (0.000122) (0.000207) 
Wage squared -0.0000196*** 0.0000157*** 0.0000288*** 
 (0.00000321) (0.00000210) (0.00000503) 
Profit -0.000000594*** -0.000000603*** -0.00000101*** 
 (0.000000127) (0.000000159) (0.000000192) 
Profit growth -0.000000424*** -0.000000336 -0.000000684*** 
 (0.000000119) (0.000000172) (0.000000187) 
Firm Age - 0.000145*** - 
  (0.0000227)  
Nr. of Establishments 0.0000696*** 0.0000131*** 0.0000618*** 
 (0.00000566) (0.00000213) (0.00000913) 
Nr. of Employees -0.00000288*** -0.000000664*** -0.00000266*** 
 (0.000000155) (6.02e-08) (0.000000229) 
Clustered Standard Errors Firm Individual Firm and Ind. 
Firm fixed effect  Yes No Yes 
Individual fixed effect No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Hierarchy Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,057,819 7,057,819 7,057,819 
R2 0.036 0.264 0.327 
 
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
 
 
Table 6 OLS Regressions of Cross-Firm Mobility using Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)  
Variables (1) (2) (4) (5) 
Horizontal Treatment 0.00610*** 0.00817*** — — 
 (0.00139) (0.00126)   
Vertical Treatment — — -0.00821*** -0.0103*** 
   (0.00111) (0.00115) 
Clustered Standard Error Firm Individual Firm Individual 
Controls in Table 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes No Yes No 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hierarchy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,519,172 1,519,172 1,519,172 1,519,172 
R2 0.163 0.618 0.163 0.618 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.  
Table 5. OLS Regressions of Cross-Firm Mobility: Social Proximity 
 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Horizontal wage dispersion  Age similarity (horizontal) — 0.00126***    
 — (0.000319)    
Vertical wage dispersion  Age similarity (vertical) — — -0.00143*** — — 
 — — (0.000363) — — 
Horizontal wage dispersion  Tenure similarity (horizontal) — — — 0.00431*** — 
 — — — (0.000563) — 
Vertical wage dispersion  Tenure similarity (vertical) — — — — -0.00409*** 
 — — — — (0.000645) 
Horizontal wage dispersion 0.112*** 0.129*** 0.120*** 0.134*** 0.120*** 
 (0.00469) (0.00421) (0.00356) (0.00403) (0.00356) 
Vertical wage dispersion -0.113*** -0.0666*** -0.0768*** -0.0663*** -0.0782*** 
 (0.00909) (0.00707) (0.00753) (0.00707) (0.00732) 
Age similarity (horizontal) 0.112*** 0.000470*** — — — 
 (0.00469) (0.0000629) — — — 
Age similarity (vertical) -0.113*** — 0.000831*** — — 
 (0.00909) — (0.0000408) — — 
Tenure similarity (horizontal) 0.000144 — — -0.000451*** — 
 (0.000091) — — (0.000103) — 
Tenure similarity (vertical) -0.0000591 — — — 0.000666*** 
 (0.000095) — — — (0.0000693) 
Clustered Standard Errors Firm  Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Controls in Table 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hierarchy Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,057,819 7,057,819 7,057,819 7,057,819 7,057,819 
R2 0.316 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.313 
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Table 7 OLS Regressions of Cross-Firm Mobility: Destination Firm (Conditional on Mobility) 
Variables 
Horizontal wage 
dispersion at 
destination 
(1) 
Vertical wage 
dispersion at 
destination 
(2) 
   
Horizontal wage dispersion  Top earner (horizontal)  0.0101*** — 
 (0.00259) — 
Horizontal wage dispersion  Bottom earner (horizontal) −0.0107*** — 
 (0.00274) — 
Vertical wage dispersion  Top earner (vertical)  — 0.00214 
 — (0.00152) 
Vertical wage dispersion  Bottom earner (vertical) — 0.00319* 
 — (0.00150) 
Top earner (horizontal) 0.000663 — 
 (0.000525) — 
Bottom earner (horizontal)  0.00161** — 
 (0.000554) — 
Top earner (vertical) — −0.000125 
 — (0.000161) 
Bottom earner (vertical)  — −0.000313 
 — (0.000169) 
Horizontal wage dispersion 0.0303*** 0.000707 
 (0.00123) (0.000535) 
Vertical wage dispersion 0.00221 −0.00728*** 
 (0.00123) (0.000642) 
Clustered Standard Errors Firm Firm 
Firm fixed effect (Destination) Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Hierarchy Dummies Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effect Yes Yes 
Controls in Table 3 Yes Yes 
Observations 378,463 378,463 
R2 0.803 0.946 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
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 Table 8                          Logistic Regressions of Mobility: Individual Ability (GPA) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Horizontal wage dispersion 0.131*** 0.126*** — 0.127*** 
 (0.00490) (0.00519) — (0.00521) 
Vertical wage dispersion -0.0559*** — -0.0445*** -0.0570*** 
 (0.00975) — (0.00989) (0.00991) 
Horizontal wage dispersion  High GPA (horizontal) — 0.0311*** — 0.0303*** 
 — (0.00774) — (0.00792) 
Horizontal wage dispersion  Low GPA (horizontal) — -0.00535 — -0.00618 
 — (0.00758) — (0.00773) 
Vertical wage dispersion  High GPA (vertical) — — 0.0102 -0.00101 
 — — (0.00929) (0.00954) 
Vertical wage dispersion  Low GPA (vertical) — — 0.00299 0.00829 
 — — (0.00901) (0.00921) 
High GPA (horizontal) — -0.00380* — -0.00519** 
 — (0.00148) — (0.00159) 
Low GPA (horizontal) — 0.00406** — 0.00337* 
 — (0.00146) — (0.00164) 
High GPA (vertical) — — 0.00150 0.00233 
 — — (0.00108) (0.00127) 
Low GPA (vertical) — — 0.00257* 0.000233 
 — — (0.00105) (0.00129) 
Employee GPA -0.0000307 — — — 
 (0.0000665) — — — 
Clustered Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Controls in Table 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hierarchy Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,027,115 4,027,115 4,027,115 4,027,115 
R2 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Data on college GPA is available for 57% of our sample.  
 
 
                      Table 9                                                    Logistic Regressions of Mobility: Wage Transparency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Horizontal Wage Dispersion 0.153*** 0.129*** 0.0475*** -0.0407*** 
 (0.00324) (0.00361) (0.00377) (0.00407) 
Vertical Wage Dispersion -0.0102*** -0.00917** -0.0108*** 0.00283 
 (0.00303) (0.00340) (0.00280) (0.00311) 
Ratsit  0.0720*** 0.0600*** 0.292*** 0.249*** 
 (0.000458) (0.00102) (0.00195) (0.00216) 
Horizontal Dispersion x Ratsit  - 0.0682*** - 0.262*** 
  (0.00453)  (0.00455) 
Vertical Dispersion x Ratsit  - -0.00160 - -0.0365*** 
  (0.00427)  (0.00396) 
Clustered Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm and Ind. Firm and Ind. 
Controls in Table 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effect No No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hierarchy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,057,819 7,057,819 7,057,819 7,057,819 
R2 0.131 0.131 0.701 0.701 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.  
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